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the bankruptcy costs (93.79 percent times $44,327, the total
amount paid in the year in question, 1995).16
In Cox v. Comm’r,17 the husband was a corporate employee.
The wife opened a western wear store which failed the
following year.  The spouses each filed Chapter 7
bankruptcy.  The combined debts totaled $163,819 of which
$159,822 was attributable to the wife’s western wear store.
The issue before the Tax Court was whether the $1500
attorney’s fee (reduced from $5,000) was deductible as a
business expense.
The court said the key question is whether the claim arises
in connection with the taxpayer’s profit-seeking activities.18
Accordingly, the court concluded that the bankruptcies were
caused by the failure of the western wear business.  Thus, the
debtors were entitled to deduct an amount which bore the
same ratio to the $1500 fee as the claims of the business
creditors ($159,822) bore to the total claims of creditors
($163,819).  The Tax Court rebuffed the argument by the
Internal Revenue Service that the “fresh start” from
bankruptcy was a personal benefit and, therefore, no portion
of the fees was deductible.  The court agreed that the fresh
start was a consequence of the bankruptcies, not the cause,
and thus was irrelevant to the determination of deductibility.19
A 1963 U.S. Supreme Court case, Unit d States v. Gilmore,20
had resolved that issue.  The court said that the question of
whether legal expenses incurred in divorce proceedings
attributable to the former spouse’s claim to controlling stock
interests in three corporations were deductible was properly
based on the test of whether the claim arose in connection
with the taxpayer’s profit-seeking activities, not the
consequences which might result from failure to defeat the
claim.21
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 5 Harl, Agricultural Law § 39.04[2][a][ii]
(1999).
2 I.R.C. § 1398(h)(1).
3 In re Wills, 46 B.R. 333 (D. Md. 1985).
4 I.R.C. § 1398(h)(1); 11 U.S.C. § 123.
5 11 U.S.C. § 503.
6 I.R.C. § 1398(e)(3).
7 T.C. Memo. 2000-82.
8 Id.
9 Id.  See I.R.C. § 162.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 See note 7 supra.
13  Id.
14 Cox v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1981-552.
15 Id.
16 Catalano v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-82.
17 T.C. Memo. 1981-552.
18 Id.
19 See United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963).
20 Id.
21 Id.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
PERMISSIVE USE. The defendants’ predecessor in
interest received the land by patent from the U.S. and
constructed a fence near the boundary to separate the land
from the neighboring public land. The neighboring land
was eventually conveyed to the predecessor in interest to
the plaintiff’s property; however, the fence remained
between the properties, even though the fence was
constructed on the plaintiff’s property, creating a 7.3 acre
strip not on the defendant’s deed. The defendant’s daughter
constructed a residence on one acre within the disputed
strip. The disputed strip was otherwise undeveloped. When
a survey showed the true boundary line, the plaintiff sought
to quiet title in the disputed strip. The defendants argued
that title to the disputed strip passed to them by adverse
possession or by boundary acquiescence. The court found
that the fence was never intended to be placed on the
boundary line because the fence was simply barbwire
stretched from tree to tree  in an irregular fashion. The court
noted that property transferred from the government always
had straight line boundaries. The court held that the fence
was merely a fence of convenience, constructed merely to
separate the land from public land. The court held further
that a fence of convenience created a permissive use of the
property within the fence and beyond the true boundary
line; therefore, no adverse possession could occur.
However, the court allowed title in the one acre with the
residence to pass by adverse possession because the
construction of a residence exceeded the permissive use
evidenced by the fence and created a use open and hostile
to the true title. Kimball v. Turner, 993 P.2d 303 (Wyo.
1999).
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
EXEMPTIONS .
HOMESTEAD. The debtors owned an 80 acre farm
w ich was split for mortgage loan purposes into a 20 acre
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tract with the residence and a 60 acre tract for farming only.
Each tract was separately deeded to the debtors. The split
was required by the lender and was not otherwise
recognized by the debtors who treated both tracts as one
property. The debtors’ Chapter 13 plan provided for
abandonment of the residential 20 acres to the lender and
application of the homestead exemption as to the remaining
60 acres. The debtors planned to build a residence on the 60
acre tract. The Bankruptcy Court had held that the 60 acre
tract was not eligible for the Wyoming homestead
exemption because, on the date of the petition,  the tract
was separated and did not contain the residence. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the homestead
exemption attached to the entire property, including the
portion which does not contain the residence; therefore, on
the date of the petition, the debtors had established their
homestead rights as to the 60 acre parcel. In re Kwiecinski,
245 B.R. 672 (Bankr. 10th Cir. 2000).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The debtor filed for Chapter 7
and the bankruptcy trustee sold the debtor’s residence,
resulting in capital gain of $77,000. On the bankruptcy
estate’s income tax return, the trustee reported the gain
from the sale of the residence but excluded the gain from
income under I.R.C. § 121, as amended in 1997 (allowing
exclusion of gain). The court held that the amendment of
Section 121 broadened the policy scope of the statute to
include exclusion by bankruptcy estates. In addition, the
court held that the plain language of I.R.C. § 1398 allows
tax attributes of the debtor to pass to the bankruptcy estate,
including the right to an exclusion of gain from the sale of
the residence. In re Bradley, 245 B.R. 533 (M.D. Tenn.
1999), aff’g, 222 B.R. 313 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1998).
SET-OFF. The debtor owed taxes for 1991 which were
dischargeable in the debtor’s Chapter 7 case. The debtor
filed the case in March 1997 and claimed a refund for 1996
as exempt. The exemption was not challenged but the IRS
sought to offset the refund against the 1991 taxes. The IRS
argued that the setoff provision, allowing setoff of the
refund against the pre-petition tax debt, took precedence
over the exemption. The court held that exempt property
was not subject to the setoff provisions because the exempt
property was not part of the bankruptcy estate. In re
Alexander, 245 B.R. 280 (W.D. Ky. 2000), aff’g, 225
B.R. 145 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1998).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
DISASTER PAYMENTS . The plaintiffs were farmers
who had suffered crop damage and losses from a late freeze
and excessive rains in 1989. The plaintiffs had also treated
their crops with a herbicide which was contaminated with a
defoliant. Prior to learning about the contamination, the
plaintiffs applied for disaster payments, listing the sole
cause of loss as the weather conditions. The plaintiffs
received disaster payments. After the disaster payments
were received, the plaintiffs discovered the contamination
and sued the herbicide manufacturer for damages. During
the trial, the jury was made aware of the disaster payments
received by the plaintiffs, but the plaintiffs presented no
evidence that the jury award was reduced because of this
i form tion. The plaintiffs alleged that a USDA lawyer told
them that their eligibility for the disaster payments would
n t be affected by the trial or any admission that some of
the d mage was caused by the herbicide. During the trial
the plaintiffs alleged that the contaminated herbicide was
responsible for 30 percent of the crop losses. After the trial
th  USDA audited the plaintiffs’ payments and determined
that l ss than 50 percent of the crop was lost from weather
related conditions because 30 percent of the loss was from
herbicide contamination, a loss not covered by the disaster
payment program. The plaintiffs argued that the
contaminated herbicide made the crops more susceptible to
the weather conditions such that the contamination
accelerated the losses from the weather conditions. The
court held that the regulations, 7 C.F.R. § 1477.3(f),
restricted the cause of the acceleration to the weather
conditions, such as drought causing increased crop
susceptibility to insect damage. Therefore, the herbicide
damage was not a natural weather condition which was
covered by the disaster payment program. The plaintiffs did
provide some evidence of a neighboring farm where no
herbicide was used but the farmer lost more than 50 percent
of the crop from weather conditions. The court held that
this evidence was insufficient to prove that at least 50
percent of the damage on the sprayed acres arose from
weather conditions. The plaintiffs also argued that the
USDA was estopped from seeking reimbursement because
the USDA lawyer had said that the USDA would not seek
reimbursement. The court held that the USDA was not
bound by the lawyer’s representations. Harrod v.
Glickman, 206 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 2000).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT . The debtor was a corporation which operated a chain
of restaurants. The debtor had received, but not paid for,
produce from a produce supplier. The supplier sought to
have some of the debtor’s assets declared to be part of the
PACA trust from which the supplier’s claims should be
paid. The debtor argued that PACA did not apply to the
debtor because the debtor was not a dealer under the act.
The statute, 7 U.S.C. § 499e(b)(6), defined a dealer as a
person in the business of buying or selling wholesale or
jobbing quantities of perishable agricultural commodities.
The regulations, 7 C.F.R. § 46.2(x), defined “wholesale or
jobbing quantities” as at least one ton of aggregate
commodities in any one day. The debtor often received
more than one ton of commodities in any given day. The
court, however, declared the terms “wholesale or jobbing
quantities” as ambiguous and found a statement of the
USDA in the legislative history that the USDA did not
consid r restaurants to be dealers unless they purchased
commodities for other entities. The court held that the
debtor, s a restaurant, was not intended by the law, as
interpreted by the USDA, to be a dealer under PACA;
t refore, no PACA trust existed to satisfy the claim of the
supplier. In re Old Fashioned Enterprises, Inc., 245 B.R.
639 (D. Neb. 2000).
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The debtor was a corporation which operated a chain of
restaurants. The debtor had received, but not paid for,
produce from a produce supplier. The supplier sought to
have some of the debtor’s assets declared to be part of the
PACA trust from which the supplier’s claims should be
paid. The debtor argued that PACA did not apply to the
debtor because the debtor was not a dealer under the act.
The statute, 7 U.S.C. § 499e(b)(6), defined a dealer as a
person in the business of buying or selling wholesale or
jobbing quantities of perishable agricultural commodities.
The regulations, 7 C.F.R. § 46.2(x), defined “wholesale or
jobbing quantities” as at least one ton of aggregate
commodities in any one day. The debtor often received
more than one ton of commodities in any given day.
However, the debtor argued that PACA did not apply to the
debtor because the debtor was primarily a retail restaurant
and not primarily a buyer and seller of produce. The court
rejected that argument, holding that the definition of dealer
included persons who either purchased or sold large
quantities of produce. The court also rejected the argument
that the definition of dealer was ambiguous and that the
USDA policy of not enforcing PACA against restaurants
was to be given any deference. The court held that the
debtor was a dealer subject to PACA trust provisions. The
issue now has several decisions on both sides and needs
Supreme Court or legislative guidance. In re Country
Harvest Buffet Restaurants, Inc., 245 B.R. 650 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 2000).
SOYBEANS. The AMS has announced that its Request
for Referendum showed that too few soybean producers
wanted a referendum on the Soybean Promotion and
Research Order for one to be conducted. The Request for
Referendum was held from October 20, 1999, through
November 16, 1999, at the FSA offices. To trigger a
referendum 60,082 soybean producers had to complete a
Request for Referendum. The  number of soybean
producers requesting a referendum was 17,970. 65 Fed.
Reg. 30832 (May 15, 2000).
STORAGE FACILITIES . The CCC has issued interim
regulations implementing a farm storage facility loan
program to provide financing for producers to build or
upgrade farm storage and handling facilities. Specific
eligibility requirements for applicants are a satisfactory
credit rating as determined by CCC; no delinquent federal
debt as defined by the Debt Collection Improvement Act of
1996; production of facility loan commodities; proof of
crop insurance from FCIC or a private company;
compliance with USDA provisions for highly erodible land
and wetlands; ability to repay the debt resulting from the
program; compliance with any applicable local zoning, land
use and building codes for the applicable farm storage
facility structures; and need for new or additional farm
grain storage or handling capacity. 65 Fed. Reg. 30345
(May 11, 2000), adding 7 C.F.R. Part 1436.
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
CLAIMS . The IRS has issued a nonacquiescence in the
following decision but will follow the decision in the Fifth
Circuit. On the date of the decedent’s death, the decedent
was involved in a suit filed by the lessor of an oil lease for
exc ss royalty payments made to the decedent. The lessor
rec ived some favorable rulings soon after the decedent’s
d ath but settled for a smaller sum than was originally
sought from the decedent 15 months after the decedent’s
death. The decedent’s estate valued the law suit claim as of
the decedent’s death, based on the money judgment sought
by the lessor. The IRS argued that the claim was to be
valued at the amount that the estate eventually paid or that
the estate had discharge of indebtedness income when the
settlement was reached to the extent the actual amount paid
was less than the claim allowed for estate tax purposes. The
court held that the value of the claim was to be determined
as of t  date of death, based on the information available
at that time. The court also held that the estate did not
recognize discharge of indebtedness income when it settled
for an amount less than the claim’s value as of the date of
death. Estate of Smith v. Comm’r, 198 F.3d 515 (5th Cir.
1999), rev’g, 108 T.C. 412 (1997), I.R.B. 2000-__.
DONEE LIABILITY. The decedent had made several
inter vivos gifts to the taxpayer but did not include the gifts
on gift tax returns. The IRS had assessed gift tax against the
decedent before death. After the decedent’s death the IRS
sought payment of the taxes from the donee. The
decedent’s estate had challenged the gift tax assessment in
the Tax Court and the case was still pending. The IRS ruled
that it had the authority to impose personal liability on a
donee for unpaid gift tax but that it would wait until the Tax
Court case was concluded before determining the amount
of liability. The IRS stated that its policy was to pursue the
donee only where collection from the donor is not possible.
Ltr. Rul. 200018013, Jan. 11, 2000.
MARITAL DEDUCTION . The decedent’s estate passed
all the estate in trust to the decedent’s spouse. The estate
failed to timely file the estate tax return on which a QTIP
election and reverse QTIP election were made. The
decedent’s will had made provision for allocation of trust
assets to two trusts, one of which was to be funded to the
extent of the GST exemption amount. The IRS ruled that,
because the return was filed late, the GST exemption
amount had to be allocated by the automatic allocation
provision which allocated the exemption amount according
to the property received by the skip persons. The IRS also
ruled that the QTIP and reverse QTIP elections were timely
made because the QTIP election was made on the first
estate tax return  and the reverse QTIP election was made
on the same return as the QTIP election. Because the GST
exemption amount exceeded the property passing from the
estate, all of the exemption was allocated to the reverse
QTIP trust. Ltr. Rul. 200018036, Feb. 4, 2000.
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FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14]. The taxpayer had sued a construction company
for fraud, conspiracy and breach of contract arising out of a
contract to make repairs to the taxpayer’s house. The jury
awarded over $6 million to the taxpayer, of which $153,000
was for compensatory damages and $6 million was for
punitive damages. The lawsuit was filed on May 11, 1989
and the jury award was paid in 1992. The court held that the
amendment to I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) which was enacted in the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA 1989),
Pub. L. 101-239, sec. 7641(a), 103 Stat. 2106 (1989) stated
that the amendment did not apply to lawsuits filed before
July 10, 1989; therefore, the amendment did not apply in
this case and the punitive damage award was included in
the taxpayer’s income. However, the court also held that the
award was to be decreased by the amount of attorney’s fees
paid out of the award. The IRS had argued that the
attorney’s fees should have been treated as a miscellaneous
itemized deduction. The appellate court affirmed, holding
that the attorney fee issue was controlled by Cotnam v.
Comm’r, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959). Davis v. Comm’r,
2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,431 (11th Cir. 2000),
aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1998-248.
After suffering a stroke, the taxpayer allowed the
taxpayer’s sons to run the taxpayer’s business. The business
did not succeed under the sons’ management and the
taxpayer sought to regain control of the business. The
taxpayer eventually filed a personal injury suit against the
sons, alleging that the sons’ mismanagement of the business
caused the taxpayer emotional and physical distress. The
parties eventually reached a settlement which stated that the
settlement proceeds were paid entirely for the personal
injuries suffered by the taxpayer. The IRS argued that the
settlement proceeds were paid to compensate the taxpayer
for the economic losses of the business and that the
proceeds were included in gross income. The court held
that the proceeds were excludible from gross income as
amounts paid for personal injuries because the intention of
the parties was that only the personal injury claims were
valid and that the proceeds were paid solely for the personal
injuries. Estate of Schoeneman, T.C. Memo. 2000-161.
DISASTER PAYMENTS . On April 28, 2000, the
president determined that certain areas in Maine are eligible
for assistance under the Act as a result of severe storms,
flooding and ice jams on March 28, 2000. FEMA-1326-
DR. On May 3, 2000, the President determined that certain
areas in Kansas are eligible for assistance under the Act as a
result of severe storms and tornadoes on April 19-20, 2000.
FEMA-1327-DR. Accordingly, a taxpayer who sustained a
loss attributable to the disasters may deduct the loss on his
or her 1999 federal income tax return.
HOME OFFICE . The taxpayer operated a consulting
business out of an office in the taxpayer’s garage. The
taxpayer deducted expenses associated with the residence in
proportion to the ratio of square feet in the garage as to the
total square footage of the residence. The court disallowed a
deduction for the home office, however, because the
taxpayer did not have records of the taxpayer’s business
activity in the office and at clients’ locations. The court
held that the taxpayer failed to prove that the office was the
taxpayer’s principal place of business. Beale v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 2000-158.
IRA . The decedent had owned an IRA with the
decedent’s child designated as the primary remainder
beneficiary. However, the decedent was receiving
distributions based solely upon the decedent’s life
expectancy, recalculated each year. The child began
receiving the distributions after the decedent’s death based
on the child’s life expectancy. The child was 43 years old
when the decedent died. The IRS ruled that (1) the child
was the designated beneficiary of the IRA, (2) the child was
timely designated as the beneficiary, (3) the child may use
the child’s life expectancy for calculating distributions even
though the decedent used only the decedent’s life
expectancy for calculating distributions, and (4) upon the
child’s death the annual distributions of any remainder will
equal the annual distributions to the child. Ltr. Rul.
200018057, Feb. 9, 2000.
MARKET SEGMENT TRAINING GUIDE . The IRS
has announced the publication of a revised Market Segment
Specialization Program Audit Technique Guide—Livestock
Industry.
MEDICAL DEDUCTION . The taxpayer had a
dependent who had a chronic disease. The dependent’s
physician recommended that the taxpayer travel to another
city  to attend a medical conference primarily on the disease
suffered by the dependent. The physician recommended the
conference as a means to obtain information which would
aid in the treatment of the disease. The IRS ruled that the
travel costs and conference registration fees were
deductible as medical expenses but that the cost of meals
and lodging were not deductible. Rev. Rul. 2000-24, I.R.B.
2000-19, 963.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM  § 7.03.*
TAX SHELTERS. The taxpayer was a limited partnership
engaged in the production of livestock and offering two
types of partnership interests. One set of interests had a
fixed rate of return and a liquidation preference but did not
share in profits and losses. The other interests shared in the
profits and losses. The sales of both interests were required
to be registered with the state securities commission. The
taxpayer obtained exemption letters for three sales of
limited amounts of the partnership interests. The taxpayer
transferred its breeding and research division to another
partnership in which the taxpayer retained a substantial
ownership interest. Two other persons owned minimal
interests. The new partnership’s operations remained
integral to the taxpayer’s business. Both partnerships used
the cash method of accounting. The IRS ruled that, because
the taxpayer’s interests were required to be registered under
state law or exempted from registration before any sale, the
taxpayer was a farming syndicate and a tax shelter
prohibited from using the cash method of accounting. The
IRS also ruled that there were insufficient facts to
determine whether the second partnership was a farming
syndicate or tax shelter because the connection with the
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taxpayer was unclear and the purpose for forming the
second partnership was not clear. The IRS ruled that, if the
second partnership was formed with the intent to
circumvent the tax shelter provisions enforceable against
the taxpayer, the second partnership would be held to be a
tax shelter also. FSA Ltr. Rul. 200018018, Jan. 13, 2000.
PENSION PLANS. The taxpayer was an employer
which provided a 401(k) plan for its employees. Employees
were allowed to make additional voluntary contributions
from wages. Less than 85 percent of the employer’s assets
were sold to an unrelated company and the employees with
jobs associated with the sold assets also became employed
by the second employer. The taxpayer distributed the plan
vested amounts, including the voluntary contributions, to
the employees who took the new jobs with the second
employer. The IRS ruled that the distributions would not
disqualify the taxpayer’s plan because the change of
employment status resulting from the sale of assets was a
“change in service” for purposes of I.R.C. § 401(k). Rev.
Rul. 2000-27, I.R.B. 2000-21.
The taxpayer owned a sole proprietorship accounting
business. The taxpayer adopted a self-employed retirement
money purchase plan. For 1994, the taxpayer did not make
any contributions to the plan during the plan year. The
taxpayer filed for the automatic extension to file the income
tax return for 1994 and received another extension to file
until October 16, 1995. The contributions to the plan were
made just before the return was filed on October 16, 1995
and the taxpayer claimed a deduction for the contributions
on the return. The IRS assessed an excise tax of 10 percent
of the 1994 contributions for failure of the taxpayer to make
the contributions in a timely manner. Under Treas. Reg. §
1.412(c)-12(b), contributions are subject to the excise tax if
not made within eight and one-half months after the close
of the plan year. The taxpayer argued that the contributions
were timely because made with the time for filing the
income tax return plus any extensions because (1) the plan
provided that contributions could be made up to the date of
the filing of the income tax return plus any extensions and
(2) I.R.S. Pub. 560, Retirement Plans for the Self-
Employed, provided that the deduction for the contributions
was available only for contributions made before the filing
of the return plus extensions.. The court held that the
regulations took precedence over the plan language and that
the Pub. 560 language applied only to the deductibility of
the contributions and not to the timeliness of the
contributions as to the excise tax. Therefore, the court held
that the contributions were made late and were subject to
the 10 percent excise tax. Wenger v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 2000-156.
RETURNS. The IRS has released revised Form 5452
(May 2000), Corporate Report of Nondividend
Distributions. The document is available at no charge: (1)
by calling the IRS's toll-free telephone number, 1-800-829-
3676); (2) at http://www.irs.gov/prod; (3) through
FedWorld on the Internet; or (4) by directly accessing the
Internal Revenue Information Services bulletin board at
(703) 321-8020.
S CORPORATIOS-ALM  § 7.02[3][c].*
SHAREHOLDER BASIS. The taxpayer was the sole
shareholder in several S corporations. A couple of the
corporations ceased business and the taxpayer paid taxes
owed by those corporations. However, the taxpayer
presented no evidence that the taxpayer’s interest in those
corporations became worthless. The other corporations
made loans to the taxpayer but the taxpayer had no records
of repayments to the corporations. The taxpayer sought to
claim pass-through deductions and losses from the
corporations but the court held that the deductions and
losses could not be allowed without adequate proof of the
taxpay r’s basis in each corporation and adequate proof that
th  stock in the corporations was worthless. DeJoy v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-162.




AFR 6.53 6.43 6.38 6.35
110 percent AFR 7.19 7.07 7.01 6.97
120 percent AFR 7.87 7.72 7.65 7.60
Mid-term
AFR 6.62 6.51 6.46 6.42
110 percent AFR 7.29 7.16 7.10 7.06
120 percent AFR 7.96 7.81 7.74 7.69
Long-term
AFR 6.39 6.29 6.24 6.21
110 percent AFR 7.04 6.92 6.86 6.82
120 percent AFR 7.69 7.55 7.48 7.43
Rev. Rul. 2000-28, I.R.B. 2000-__.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayer was the income
beneficiary of a trust established by the taxpayer’s parent.
The only asset of the trust was the taxpayer’s residence.
The taxpayer was currently living in an assisted care facility
and the trustee was planning to either lease or sell the
residence. The taxpayer had no power over trust corpus or
discretionary authority to distribute trust corpus. The IRS
ruled that the taxpayer would not be treated as the owner of
the trust nor as the owner of the residence. Therefore, the
trustee could not make use of I.R.C. § 121 to exclude any
gain from the sale of the residence from trust income. L r.
Rul. 200018021, Jan. 21, 2000.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME. During the tax years
involved the taxpayers were married. The wife operated a
medical transcription service and the husband was fully
employed elsewhere. The husband prepared the tax returns
and divided the income from the transcription business
equally between himself and his wife. The court found that
the wife exercised substantially all the management and
control of the business and performed most of the day-to-
day operations; therefore, the court held that all of the
transcription service income was self-employment income
to the wife. Charlton v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. No. 22 (2000).
LABOR
CHICKEN CATCHERS. The plaintiffs were chicken
catchers for the defendant, a vertically integrated poultry
operation. The defendant contracted with farms for the
growing of chickens supplied by the defendant. The
defendant hired crew leaders, usually experienced chicken
catchers, to provide the chicken catcher crews. The
def ndant established all of the procedures, equipment and
financing of the chicken catcher crews but paid only the
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crew leaders on a unit basis. The defendant treated the crew
leaders as independent contractors even though the IRS had
ruled that the crew leaders were employees for federal tax
purposes. The plaintiffs were often required to work more
than 40 hours per week and to work on weekends and
holidays but were not paid any overtime. The plaintiffs
sought three years of back overtime wages, charging that
the defendant willfully violated the Fair Labor Standards
Act. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs were
employees of the crew leaders only and that the plaintiffs
were agricultural laborers excluded from protection of the
FLSA. The court held that the crew leaders, and therefore
the plaintiffs, were employees of the defendant because (1)
the defendant had complete control over the work
performed; (2) the crew leaders had no opportunity to
increase the profit from the operation because the crew
leader’s compensation was determined by the defendant
and not negotiated; (3) the defendant provided all the
equipment; (4) the crew leaders had long-standing,
permanent and exclusive relationship with the defendant;
(5)  the crew leader did not provide any special skill or
expertise for the work; and (6) the work was integral to the
defendant’s operation. The court also held that the
agricultural labor issue was decided by the Supreme Court
in Holly Farms v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392 (1996) which held
that chicken catchers were not agricultural labor under the
National Labor Relations Act. The court held that the FSLA
and NLRA used the same meaning for the term
“agricultural labor.” The defendant was required to pay
three years of back overtime wages instead of two years
because the defendant willfully violated the FSLA overtime
provisions. The court found that the defendant had prior
warning from the IRS that the crew leaders would be
treated as employees and warning from Holly Farms that
chicken catchers were not exempt agricultural laborers.




REAL ESTATE TRANSFER FEE. The taxpayers were
members of one family which originally owned a family
limited partnership. The partnership owned three parcels of
real property which were leased to third parties. The
partnership was reorganized as a limited liability company
under Wisconsin law. The reorganization did not involve
any payment of cash or property and was evidenced by a
Memorandum of Organization and Operating Agreement
which was recorded. The LLC became the owner of the real
property. The LLC was assessed a real estate transfer fee
under Wis. Stat. § 77.21(1). The taxpayers argued that no
fee was assessable because no transfer occurred. The court
held that the reorganization of the partnership into the LLC
resulted in the transfer of the real property from the
partnership to the LLC for value and was subject to the
transfer fee. Wolter v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 605
N.W.2d 283 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
PROPERTY
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. The plaintiff
owned land neighboring the defendant’s land. On both sides
of the defendant’s land were tracts of land, owned by third
parties, which had levees on their borders. The two levees
were in line with each other. The defendant’s predecessor in
interest cleared the land, including a 50 foot strip of land on
the plaintiff’s side of the line created by the two levees. A
survey by the defendant demonstrated that the true
boundary line between the defendant’s and plaintiff’s tracts
was close to the point where the clearing stopped. The
defendant constructed a levee on the true boundary. The
plaintiff argued that the levees on either side of the
defendant’s property created a boundary by acquiescence.
Although the plaintiff presented testimony of the neighbors
that everyone treated the line of the levees as the boundary
between the defendant’s and plaintiff’s properties, the court
held that no boundary by acquiescence was created because
there was no fence, lane, ditch or other similar monument
between the properties which was visible evidence of a
dividing line. Hedger Bros. Cement & Materials v.
Stump, 10 S.W.3d 926 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000).
DRAINAGE. The plaintiff owned land neighboring the
defendant’s land. The defendant constructed a levee on the
boundary between the defendant’s and plaintiff’s
properties. The defendant then constructed a drainage pipe
which drained water off the defendant’s land onto the
plaintiff’s land. The natural drainage of the properties
resulted in water draining from the defendant’s property to
the plaintiff’s property but the drain allowed the defendant
to drain more water at one time. Although the plaintiff
acknowledged that the land was often flooded, the plaintiff
argued that the increased flow during shorter times would
damage the trees on the plaintiff’s land. The court held that
the plaintiff could not enjoin the use of the drain pipe
because the plaintiff failed to provide evidence of any
increase in damage from the change in drainage flow rate.
Hedger Bros. Cement & Materials v. Stump, 10 S.W.3d
926 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000).
EASEMENT BY NECESSITY . The properties owned
by the plaintiff and defendant were once owned by one
person. When the property was split, the only access to the
defendant’s property was over a road in the corner of the
plaintiff’s property. The defendant sought an easement by
necessity over the road because the defendant needed to
move farm machinery to the defendant’s property after it
was cleared. The court granted the easement by necessity
because (1) the properties were once owned by one person,
(2) th  defendant’s property was created by severance from
the main property, and (3) the use of the road was required
at the time of the severance and continued currently.
Although the plaintiff claimed that the defendant could get
to the property through other neighboring properties, the
c urt also held that the plaintiff failed to prove that the
defendant had any other legal access to the defendant’s
property.   Hedger Bros. Cement & Materials v. Stump,
10 S.W.3d 926 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000).
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The Agricultural Law Press presents
AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINAR
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
August 16-19, 2000 Inn of the Mountain Gods, Mescalero, NM
Come join us for a world-class seminar on the hottest topics in agricultural tax and law. Space is limited for this wonderful
opportunities to gain expert insight into agricultural law and enjoy the many activities offered by this splendid resort. The resort is
very busy at this time of year, so make your reservations early.
The seminar will be Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday, August 16-19, 2000 at the Inn of the Mountain Gods resort in
the south central mountains of New Mexico. Registrants may attend one, two, three or all four days, with separate pricing for each
combination. On Wednesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On Thursday, Dr. Harl will cover farm and
ranch estate tax. On Friday, Roger McEowen will cover farm and ranch business planning. On Saturday, Roger McEowen will
cover current developments in several other areas of agricultural law. Your registration fee includes a copy of Dr. Neil Harl's
seminar manuals, Farm Income Tax (almost 300 pages) and F rm Estate and Business Planning: Annotated Materials  (nea ly
500 pages) and a copy of Roger McEowen’s outline, all of which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The seminar materials
will also be available on CD-ROM for a small additional charge. Continental buffet breakfasts and break refreshments are also
included in the registration fee.
Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
• Taxation of debt, taxation of bankruptcy, the latest on SE tax of rental of land to a family-owned entity; income averaging;
earned income credit; commodity futures transactions; paying wages in kind.
• Federal estate tax, including 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax, co-ownership discounts, alternate valuation
date, special use valuation, family-owned business deduction (FOBD), handling life insurance, marital deduction planning,
disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, and generation skipping transfer tax.
• Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
• Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private annuities, self-
canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
• Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited liability
companies.
• Legal developments in farm contracts, secured transactions, bankruptcy, real property, water law, torts, and environmental law.
Special room discounts are available at both resorts. The resorts feature a variety of splendid guest accommodations and
activities, including horseback riding, golf, sailing, hiking, tennis, fishing, and swimming.
The seminar registration fees  for current subscribers    to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles
of Agricultural Law are $175 (one day), $340 (two days), $490 (three days), and $620 (four days).  The registration fees for
nonsubscribers    are $195, $380, $550 and $700 respectively. The registration fees are higher for registrations within 30 days prior
to the seminar. A registration form is available online at www.agrilawpress.com
For more information, call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail at robert@agr awpress.com
